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I. INTRODUCTION
Some neuroscientists claim they can visualize brain images of
deception,1 an idea which piques our imagination and excites our

∗ Professor, The University of Akron School of Law. Thanks to Michael Pardo, J. Peter Rosenfeld,
John Meixner, and Andrew Balmer for comments on drafts. Particular thanks to Kristen Andrews
for all her research for this article, Jennifer Woloschyn and Jason Fuller of Akron Law Review for
the work on this symposium, and Matthew Powell for his efforts tracking down sources. Any errors
are the author’s.
1. See, e.g., D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelated Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 731 (2002) (stating that
results indicate that fMRI can detect neural correlates of cognitive differences between truth and
deception); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164, 169 (2005) (discussing the
different brain regions that appear to be associated with deception); F. Andrew Kozel et al.,
Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 2005 J. BIO. PSYCHIATRY
605, 611 (2005) (claiming that using fMRI, scientists were able to detect deception with a
cooperative individual); G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI
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deepest concerns.
At the Neuroscience, Law & Government
Symposium, two scientists described their research on the neuroimaging
of deception while other scholars considered the benefits, shortcomings,
and dangers of such neuroimages. The foundational philosophical
concern, of course, is whether we think it is wise to allow the
government and justice system to invade the privacy of thought: the last
great wilderness on Earth.
As a matter of evidence, however, the science poses formidable
juridical concerns about defining deception and determining what can be
properly inferred from the images generated. As this introduction details
briefly, the historical use of various forms of forensic science should
alert us to the potential dangers that may be implicated in the uses of
these new images. And as the article explains, the neuroimages of
deception are far from courtroom-ready.
For those scientists attempting to depict neuroimages of deception,
adequately defining the concept of deception is more complicated and
outcome-determining than one might imagine: is it uttering false words,
responding misleadingly to requests to push one button or another, or
simply attempting to think untrue thoughts on demand?2 And while
defining deception is a difficult problem,3 perhaps another focus needs
to be not on deception, but on what we mean by truth. One of the
primary goals of trials, we repeat like a mantra, is the search for truth.4
Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 833 (2003) (finding that patterns of brain activation are
different when people tell lies than they are when people tell the truth).
2. See, e.g., Phan et al., supra note 1, at 166 (noting that subjects were instructed to lie by
pressing buttons about certain playing cards); Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 729 (noting that
subjects were told they could keep a reward if they kept the identity of the card from the computer);
Sean A. Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal
Cortex to Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1413 (2008) (noting that subjects had the choice
of when to be truthful or when to deceive when answering questions vocally); F. Andrew Kozel et
al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in
Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIENCE 295, 298 (2004) (noting that
subjects were instructed to deceptively point toward the object that did not contain hidden money).
3. Various studies define deception in different ways. Compare, e.g., Ganis et al., supra
note 1, at 830 (defining deception as “when one person attempts to convince another to accept as
correct what the prevaricator believes is incorrect”), with Kozel et al., supra note 2, at 295 (2004)
(defining deception as the “purposeful misleading of another”). Other studies were designed to
distinguish between erroneous memories and intentional deception. See Tatia M.C.Lee et al., Are
Errors Differentiable from Deceptive Responses when Feigning Memory Impairment? An fMRI
Study, 69 BRAIN & COGNITION 406, 407 (2009); Nobuhito Abe et al., Neural Correlates of True
Memory, False Memory, and Deception,18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 2811, 2811(2008).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (providing that “[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined”).
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As if truth is objective, discoverable, and unchanging. But perception,
viewpoint, bias, error, and interpretation clearly affect one’s construction
of truth. Like memory, truth may well be reconstructive,5 as may be the
very idea of evidentiary reliability.6 In our evidential search for truth,
there has been an historical belief from one generation to the next that
science will lead us to truth. Trials rely on fingerprint and DNA
comparisons, ballistics and tool marks, child sexual abuse experts, and
opinions from physicians. Nevertheless, as we know both from history
and from the analysis of data generated by the Innocence Project
exonerations, using experts to prove the truth has often been a flawed
endeavor.7 As an empirical study of the first 200 defendants exonerated
by the innocence project concludes, faulty “[f]orensic evidence was the
second leading type of evidence supporting these erroneous
convictions.”8 Although possibly possessed of fine intentions, experts
make mistakes and no matter how good the science, there is always an
expected rate of error.9 Despite those experts who claim their form of
expertise is infallible, science disagrees.10

5. “[M]emory representations are not static but rather are subject to considerable change
over time. Details may be lost and information in storage may be modified so as to increase its
consistency vis-à-vis underlying knowledge.” Peter A. Ornstein, Stephen J. Ceci & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1025, 1034 (1998). Perhaps truth, like goodness, is not as clear-cut as
one would hope.
6. Professor Jennifer Mnookin makes a related point in discussing the history of testimony
about fingerprint comparisons:
There is no determinable thing called reliability that exists apart from our conceptions of
reliability. Whether something is truly reliable when seen from some idealized
Archimedean vantage point is simply the wrong question, for the Archimedean vantage
point . . . eludes us. With the passage of time, our perceptions of reliability may change;
we may come to believe that something we used to believe is no longer credible. But
our new view as much as our old view is a ‘mere’ perception of reliability.
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1743
(2001).
7. See Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/351.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (discussing convictions that resulted from flawed
forensic science); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUMB. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (2008);
Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV.
1, 7 (2007) (both discussing the role of forensic science errors in wrongful convictions).
8. Garrett, supra note 7, at 81.
9. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:20 (2005) (discussing the concept that all applied science has some error
rate).
10. Compare United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854, aff’d, 260 F.3d 597, 599
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the government’s fingerprint comparison expert testified that the rate of
error is essentially zero), with Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
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Most recently, we learned again the potential fallibility of scientific
evidence when the National Academy of Sciences issued its report on
forensic science (“NAS Report”), questioning the foundation for much
of the forensic science evidence so many courts have routinely admitted.
The NAS Report concludes that the forensic science community of
professionals has fallen far short in establishing either the validity of
their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions. The courts, it notes,
have been wholly ineffective in their gate-keeping obligations with
respect to forensic science.11
In the evidential search for truth via the medium of science, we are
often concerned with the questions and problems of causation in trials,
without recognizing the frequent tendency to erroneously infer
causation.
With new scientific discoveries possessing forensic
application, there is the always-present danger of confusing correlation
with causation, assuming a cause and effect relationship where none
exists. It is a human tendency to make inferential leaps of causation—
what we might term insights.12 However, a recurrent problem with this
inferential Archimedes-like leap from the bathtub is that it is often laden
both with error and bias.13
During the Salem witchcraft trials, Cotton Mather consulted leading
treatises on the scientific proof of witchcraft—as science was understood
in the Seventeenth Century.14 In large part, Mather, who fancied himself
a man of science, was not impressed with the use of ordeals and torture:
“going to the Devil for help against the Devil,” as he might have put it.15

Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 987-88 (2005) (noting that
despite claims that fingerprint comparison is infallible, it is far from error free), and Faigman, supra
note 9. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIENCE COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html [hereinafter NAS
FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT] (prepublication copy).
11. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-19.
12. See generally BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (3d ed. 1970) (on the nature of insight); Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross
Boundaries?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971, 974-77 (1996) (discussing the concept of insight).
13. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-15
(2002) (discussing, inter alia, problems of the expectation bias in forensic science). See NAS
FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5 (discussing the potential bias problems in
laboratories).
14. See generally Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World: Prosecutorial
Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43 (2001)
(discussing the witchcraft trials in depth).
15. Id. at 59 & n.94 (citing Wendel D. Craker, Spectral Evidence, Non-Spectral Acts of
Witchcraft, and Confession at Salem in 1692, 40 HIST. J. 331, 343 (1997)).
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Rather, he was most impressed with a scientific causation argument: If,
after a suspected witch curses, there follows death, illness or affliction,
there is a presumption of witchcraft.16 Thus, in the Bridget Bishop trial,
evidence was introduced that after Bishop had quarreled with a
particular family, the family’s pig was taken with strange fits and began
foaming at the mouth; these events were believed to be sure evidence
that Bishop had bewitched the pig. This supposed relationship, which I
have termed elsewhere “Bewitched Pig Syndrome,” was considered
solid, scientific evidence of witchcraft for more than a century.17 Today,
we might be inclined to note the “post hoc propter hoc” fallacy—“after
which, because of which.”18
Contemporary judges and juries are unlikely to be impressed by
“Bewitched Pig Syndrome” testimony.19 Yet many, both in the
courtroom and outside of it, have faith in unproven causation. Consider
the prevalence of legal claims resting on unproven causation and the
public’s trust in the efficacy of “miraculous” but untested herbal cures.20
While scientists recognize that the plural of anecdote is not data but
simply anecdotes,21 courts and the public are not so convinced.
In contraposition to most forensic science, polygraph evidence has
encountered many stones in the pass-way to becoming courtroom
evidence. The Supreme Court majority determined there was no
consensus as to the reliability of polygraph evidence, and a majority of
state and federal courts disallow it.22 Nonetheless, I do not believe
courts are primarily concerned with the reliability of such instruments,
given their willingness to routinely admit all types of evidence with
proven track records of unreliability with nary a mention of such

16. Id. at 60-61 (discussing the Salem judges’ reliance on William Perkins’ Discourse of the
Damned Art of Witchcraft and Richard Bernard’s Guide to Grand-Jury Men).
17. Id. at 71.
18. “Which/witch” pun unintended but appreciated.
19. But see David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of
Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 817 (1996) (discussing relaxed evidentiary
standards that courts employ to admit syndrome evidence).
20. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998)
(concluding that no controlled epidemiological study found a causative relationship between
silicone breast implants and any known connective-tissue or autoimmune disease); ROBERT L.
PARK, VOODOO SCIENCE: THE ROAD FROM FOOLISHNESS TO FRAUD 46-48 (2000) (describing the
public’s belief in alternative healing, despite the lack of a foundation for many claims).
21. The proper attribution to the author of this phrase seems unlikely. For more on the murky
origins of the excellent but difficult-to-attribute phrase, see The Matthew Effect,
http://bearcastle.com/blog/?m=20050808 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
22. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1998) (discussing the scientific
disagreement of polygraph reliability and courts’ widespread disfavor of such evidence).
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concerns.23 Rather, the judicial distain seems to center on expert
evidence that opines on whether a given witness is telling the truth.24
Courts’ disfavor of the polygraph may be due to their long-stated
appreciation of juries’ ability to weigh credibility or the seemingly
innate dislike we all share of our private thoughts being exposed.
As a form of expert testimony, polygraph evidence is riddled with
causation problems. A key concern is that it conflates correlation with
causation; its design measures anxiety or arousal as manifested in blood
pressure, galvanic skin response, and respiration, resting on the
assumption that lying will provoke an anxious response.25 But some
polygraph subjects are not anxious and do not exhibit physiological
correlates of anxiety.26 And asking an innocent person “did you kill
John Doe” may well evoke an anxious (but believed to be guilty)
reaction. Additionally, measuring physiological responses to a question
about murder against a control question like “did you ever steal anything
as a child” may not be sufficiently discerning to determine serious lies
from truth, since such a control question cannot pose the same level of
stress that the real life questions can.27 Thus, the first problem is that the
polygraph uses anxiety as a proxy for guilt, both overreaching and
under-reaching, not recognizing that while there may often be some
correlation between anxiety and guilt, the proof of actual causation is not
as surefooted as claimed. The second problem is that it is incredibly
difficult to create real-world consequences in control questions. The
third problem is that countermeasures are potentially effective against
the polygraph, competently disguising a “guilt” reaction.28
The use of science in the search for truth poses consistent
evidentiary problems of definition, causation, validity, accuracy,
inferential conclusions unsupported by data, and real-world
23. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, n.7 (1983) (upholding the decision to
admit expert testimony about future dangerousness even though experts had indicated it might be
accurate in only one of three predictions); United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 122 (D.
Mass. 2005) (discussing the unreliability of toolmark and ballistic evidence based on scholarly
criticism but noting that “court after court” has allowed its admission); NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-19.
24. 1 JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS § 8:23, at 8-34 n.4 (2008) (citing cases disallowing expert testimony about whether a child
was being truthful in alleging sexual abuse).
25. See, e.g., Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM.
TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION
2-3 (2003) [hereinafter POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION].
26. Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830.
27. See, e.g., Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 731.
28. See, e.g., POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 25, at 139-40.
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complications. And these evidentiary problems may well be implicated
in the forensic use of neuroimages of deception. This article first briefly
describes the various types of neuroimaging used to detect deception and
describes some of the specific criticisms that have been leveled at the
science.
Second, the article outlines the standards governing
admissibility and explains why the research to date does not yet meet
any recognized standards of admissibility. Third, and finally, the article
suggests that courts act with restraint in deciding questions of
admissibility of such evidence, recognizing the lessons of historical
experience with forensic science.
II. THE NEUROIMAGING OF DECEPTION
A. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as a Detection Device
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has created a new
way of visualizing brain activity and allows researchers to examine the
brain with “higher sensitivity and accuracy . . . [and] view the brain ‘in
action.’”29 While MRI visualizes anatomical details in living things by
considering magnetic charges, fMRI records “the difference between
oxygenated and nonoxygenated blood cells due to their magnetic
charges, so more active neurons can be distinguished from less active
ones.”30
Distinct from MRI, fMRI is correlated with brain function rather
than brain structure.31 Thus, when an experimental subject is assigned
specific tasks or functions, the fMRI seeks to detect the correlation
between mental activities and activated neural systems.32 Although
based on the same technology as MRI, fMRI measures localized changes
in the brain as an individual is performing a selected task.33 Unlike
some other forms of neuroimaging, such as CAT scans and MRI, which
appear in shades of gray, fMRI data are depicted as vivid and colorful

29. Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and Violent
Behavior, 6 TRAUMA VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 176, 176 (2005).
30. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 98
(2006).
31. Stephen B. Billick & Stephen P. Sullivan, Neuroimaging in Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 463, 465 (Richard Rosner ed.,
2d ed. 2003).
32. MORENO, supra note 30, at 98–99.
33. Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED & ETHICS 844, 844 (2005).
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images in three-dimensional computer-generated images of the brain.34
Researchers have used fMRI to study a range of conditions and illnesses,
including Alzheimer’s disease and various psychiatric disorders such as
schizophrenia and addiction.35 To date, however, few courts have
admitted fMRI evidence at trial.36
In recent years, neuroscientists have used fMRI technology to
attempt to identify brain regions associated with deception.37
Neuropsychological studies typically rely on blood oxygenation level
dependent (“BOLD”) fMRI, which “track[s] the changes in blood flow
that correspond to changes in local brain activity.”38
Daniel Langleben and his fellow researchers concluded, after a
small study, that fMRI could detect cognitive neurophysiological
differences between deception and truth.
“[T]here is a
neurophysiological difference between deception and truth at the brain
activation level that can be detected with fMRI.”39 Other research
studies have made similar claims.40 Dr. Steven Laken, CEO and
34. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal
Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (1997).
35. Tovino, supra note 33, at 845.
36. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S.
Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. L. 29, 39 (2008).
37. MORENO, supra note 30, at 103. See, e.g., Phan et al., supra note 1, at 169 (discussing
fMRI results indicated which regions of the brain appear to be engaged when subjects engaged in
deceptive responses).
38. Daniel D. Langleben, Frank M. Dattilio & Thomas G. Guthei, True Lies: Delusions and
Lie-Detection Technology, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 359 (2006). My description of fMRI is, by
necessity, greatly simplified. For greater technical explanation of how fMRI functions and its
limitations, see Nikos K. Logothetis, What we can and what we cannot do with fMRI, 453 NATURE
869 (2008); David J. Heeger & David Ress, What Does fMRI Tell Us About Neuronal Activity?, 3
NATURE REVIEWS 143 (2002).
39. Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 731.
40. Langleben, Dattilio, & Guthei, supra note 38, at 360; accord Langleben et al., supra note
1, at 731 (results indicated that fMRI can detect neural correlates of cognitive differences between
truth and deception); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002) [hereinafter Lie Detection]; Andrew Kozel et al.,
Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC
SCIENCE 220 (2008) [hereinafter Kozel, Mock Crime]; Donald H. Marks, Mehdi Adineh, & Sudeepa
Gupta, Determination of Truth from Deception Using Functional MRI and Cognitive Engrams, 5
THE INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY (2006), http://www.ispub.com/journal/the_internet_journal_of_
radiology/volume_5_number_1_35/article_printable/determination_of_truth_from_deception_using
_functional_mri_and_cognitive_engrams.html; Spence et al., supra note 2; Sean A. Spence et al.,
‘Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy’ or a ‘Miscarriage of Justice’? An Initial Application of
Functional Neuroimaging to the Question of Guilt Versus Innocence, 23 EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRY
309 (2008); Matthias Gamer et al., Covariations among fMRI, Skin Conductance, and Behavioral
Data During Processing of Concealed Information, 28 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 1287 (2007);
Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an Ecologically
Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial Experience, 238
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President of Cephos Corporation, a company designed in part to provide
neuroimaging deception detection through the use of fMRI, has likewise
published initial research suggesting that fMRI can detect deception in
an individual.41 His website for Cephos, however, goes further,
suggesting that fMRI to test for deception is “likely admissible in court”
since it meets the reliability standards for admissibility.42 As more fully
set forth infra, such a claim is wholly insupportable.
B. Shortcomings of fMRI to Detect Deception
Although the fMRI studies of deception done to date are both
fascinating and provocative, there is much agreement that the science is
in its early stages and is not at all ready to be admissible evidence. In a
recent article published in a British Psychological Society Journal, Dr.
Sean A. Spence, a researcher involved in the field, notes that there are
roughly only sixteen published peer-reviewed studies from essentially
four groups of reviewers.43 To date, he critiques, there is a marked
absence of replication by investigators of their own key findings and
there are inconsistencies in the procedures and methodologies used by
researchers.44 Another group of scientists involved in the field has noted
that results are not always consistent or reproducible.45 A third group of
scientists working in the area expresses concern that the design and
analysis methods across the studies vary considerably, “making it
RADIOLOGY 679 (2006); Frank Andrew Kozel, Tamara M. Padgett, & Mark S. George, A
Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852
(2004); Kozel et al., supra note 2; Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling the Truth from Lie in
Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005);
Christos Davatzikos, Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning
Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); Phan et al., supra note 1;
Kozel et al., supra note 1; Ganis et al., supra note 1; Nubuhito Abe et al., Deceiving Others:
Distinct Neural Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication and
Deception with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); G.T. Monteleone
et al., Detection of Deception Using fMRI: Better than Chance, but Well Below Perfection, 2
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2008); Abe et al., supra note 3; Lee et al., supra note 3; Hakun et. al,
Toward Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 12 SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2008).
41. See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 611.
42. See fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, http://www.cephoscorp.com/admissibilty.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). This statement is inaccurate. Currently, while fMRI is sometimes
admitted in courts to depict injury and illness, it has not been introduced to prove deception.
43. See Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 11, 13 (2008) (a few more have since been published, but
the total number appears to be around twenty).
44. Id. at 24.
45. See Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830 (noting that the results of three studies published in
2001 and 2002 “have not been consistent”).
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difficult to integrate the results.”46 Daniel Langleben candidly admitted
in an early article that several critical aspects of the “neurobiology of
deception” have not yet been studied, including tests that accurately
model real-life situations.47 In a more recent article, Dr. Langleben
notes that the accuracy from two available laboratory datasets ranges
between 76 and 90%, which is a “strong indication for more extensive
testing rather than a focus of debate on whether the upper limits of this
range is sufficient for court evidence.”48 Other scholars provide
additional critiques, noting that fMRI lie detection is “still in its
infancy”; they argue that only limited conclusions can be drawn from the
various studies done to date.49 At the University of Akron School of
Law Symposium on Neuroscience, Law & Government, Dr. Langleben
quite candidly admitted that “it’s just not ready.”50
There are numerous potential problems with drawing conclusions
from the studies: The studies are small, ranging from a single person to
less than thirty;51 the studies have used only healthy and primarily young
subjects;52 there are concerns that countermeasures may be effective, as

46. Kozel, Mock Crime, supra note 40, at 220.
47. Langleben, Dattilio, & Guthei, supra note 38, at 360. See also Kozel, Mock Crime, supra
note 40, at 231 (noting that while the mock crime employed by researchers provides a “diagnostic
ability . . . greater than chance, future work is focused on improving specificity and using more
realistic testing in order to enhance the utility of this technology in real-world applications”).
48. Daniel D. Langleben, Detection of Deception with fMRI: Are We There Yet?, 13 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2008). See also Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 835 (“[s]ubstantial .
. . research . . . on deception paradigms and . . . analysis methods remains to be conducted before we
can fully assess the potential of fMRI as a lie detection device.”).
49. Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer”
or a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 489 (2007); accord Michael S. Pardo,
Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319
(2006) (noting various concerns, including that researchers admit that fMRI deception studies are
just beginning and that the studies to date involve small sample size and relatively low stakes);
Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 402 (2007) (stating it is as yet only a ‘‘promising technology,’’ and
discussing the shortcomings of the studies). For a concise evaluation of the studies and their
limitations, see generally Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be
True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491 (2008).
50. Daniel Langleben, Speaker at the University of Akron Law Review Symposium:
Neuroscience, Law and Government (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.uakron.edu/law/
neuroscience/panel1.php.
51. See, e.g., Lie Detection, supra note 40, at 158 (only six male volunteers were analyzed in
the study); see sources cited supra note 40 (all but two studies contained less than thirty
participants); Hakun, supra note 40, at 2 (study involved one participant).
52. See, e.g., Mohamed et al., supra note 40, at 680 (“the experiments were performed in 11
healthy volunteers (five female and six male subjects; mean age, 28.9 years) who were screened for
drug use, neurological and neuropsychiatric illness . . . .”); Phan et al., supra note 1, at 165 (all
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they are with the polygraph;53 and the studies require participants who
are both compliant and honest in the execution of the test.54 Additional
concerns include the possibility of conflating correlation with causation,
where the section of the brain thought to be tied to deception is tied to
other thought processes as well; the variability of individual brains and
wide variations in “normal”;55 the inability to apply conclusions drawn
from a group to conclusions about a given individual;56 and the lack of
“real-life” consequences in the studies. In a recent study that created a
mock crime to more closely approximate real world situations, the
authors stated the test might be helpful for excluding the innocent but
was not very helpful in “ruling in” the guilty.57
Most of the neuroimaging studies focus on very simple sample
questions, as the very structure of scientific testing demands.58 In order
to generate usable data, the design of the tests is closely cabined.
Nonetheless, using neuroimages to visualize deception in the real world
may be more complicated. Will it appear as though subjects are lying
when they are responding to what turns out to be a complicated
question? For example, assume in a murder case the subject is asked
whether he was with the victim on the night of the murder. The subject
may need to ponder the question before answering, since he was with the
victim in the late afternoon but not in the evening (when the victim was
murdered). Since there are studies indicating that lies are associated

participants were healthy and without a history of head injury, learning disability, or neurological
illness).
53. Spence et al., supra note 2, at 1415 (The authors admit one of the limitations to the study
was the lack of data regarding the “ground truth” of the subjects’ embarrassing memories. The
authors did not interview others to collaborate their stories, or ask for evidence. Therefore, the
subjects could have fabricated the embarrassing stories they were asked about.).
54. See Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 612 (“Any subject who refuses to answer questions,
randomly answers questions, moves their head, or refuses to enter the scanner would not be able to
be tested.”).
55. Billick & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 46.
56. Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 835 (noting that most studies use group analyses to detect
deception); Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 605 (noting that most studies look at deception at the group
level).
57. See Kozel, Mock Crime, supra note 40, at 231 (proving that the method used to detect
deception was “sensitive but suffers from low specificity on this task for whether a subject
committed a mock crime, [indicating it] . . . would be helpful to ‘rule out’ a potential subject . . . but
not very helpful in ‘ruling in’ a suspect . . . .”). Accord Lee, supra note 3, at 410 (recognizing that
their study “is hardly comparable to real-life situations, where the detection of intentional faked
responses may result in serious consequences . . . .”).
58. See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 606 (in which subjects took a ring or a watch and
were then told to lie about the object they took).
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with a longer lapse time between question and answer,59 will the
complication of the question confound the result if he answers “no,”
since he had to expend energy to sort through the day/evening issue?
Moreover, questions arise about brain depiction differences
between a lie that is well-rehearsed, as opposed to one that is either
spontaneous or just an erroneous memory. A few studies have looked at
some of these issues,60 but more are needed. The studies only use
subjects who are of exceptional mental and physical health. What will
happen when they start testing more representative subjects, who may be
psychologically impaired, use drugs or alcohol excessively, and have
serious reasons to try to fool the examiners?
For now, the most that can be said is that the preliminary data are
fascinating but sparse.61 While there is little doubt that fMRI works well
for neural research, there are innumerable questions about the extent of
what can be stated with certainty about the interpretation of the images
generated. Every month reveals new discoveries about the areas of the
brain that are implicated in deception studies, which in and of itself
raises concerns about the underlying assumptions of brain region
activity.62
According to Professors Greely and Illes, whose interdisciplinary
article details a number of concerns with the fMRI/deception studies, the
studies “do not prove that [fMRI] . . . is currently effective as a lie
detector in the real world, at any accuracy level . . . .”63 Professor
Moreno remarks that the techniques are not yet “specific enough to
predict when a particular person is being intentionally deceptive.”64

59. Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from
Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL. SOC. LOND. B 1755, 1760 (2004)
(noting an increase in response time of lies relative to truthful responding).
60. Lee et al., supra note 3, at 407; Abe et al., supra note 3, at 2811; Ganis et al., supra note
1, at 831.
61. At the time of this article, there appear to be only about twenty-one published studies on
the neuroimaging of deception. See supra note 40 for a comprehensive list of the studies published
on the neuroimaging of deception.
62. Ganis et al. remark that there are not “brain regions . . . specialized for lying; rather . . .
[we assume] various types of lies . . . [involve] different combinations of general-purpose cognitive
processes which, as ensemble, may provide reliable neural signatures for various types of lies.
Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 833. Recently, another study found, surprisingly, that rather than just
the involvement of the inferior parietal and inferior frontal regions, the limbic system (the amygdala
and the hippocampus) was activated in response to one deceptive answer. See Hakun, supra note
40, at 5. The study theorizes that the subject may have experienced some emotional reaction or
moral dilemma related to the specific question. Id. at 7-8.
63. Greely & Illes, supra note 49, at 402 (emphasis in original).
64. MORENO, supra note 30, at 103.
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In addition to the limitations inherent in the studies themselves, the
technical process of creating neuroimages poses concerns about the
conclusions generated from these images. For example, one group of
commentators note in a recent article, “[a]lthough . . . [neuroimages] are
described as ‘real time’ brain images, the temporal resolution of the
hemodynamic response is several seconds while events relevant to
information processing are at least three orders of magnitude faster.”65
The design of studies, they note, involves statistical “analyses of
comparison.”66 Yet, none of the steps are “standardized from one
technology to the next, or from one machine or laboratory to the next.”67
Thus, the problems are not just with the design of the studies but with
the technological mechanics of their implementation as well. And the
briefly-described critiques are a handful of the many articles discussing
limitations of fMRI to detect deception.
Finally, the neuroimaging studies use voluntary subjects who agree
to be honest and compliant.68 Without question, such requirements do
not match real-world application. In sum, the studies raise as many
questions as they answer.
III. “BRAIN FINGERPRINTING” AND BEOS
Research is also being conducted with electroencephalograph
technology (EEG) to find neural correlates of deception. These studies
are not technically neuroimages but rather graphs depicting changes in
brain waves. Although it appears as though there are interesting and
promising studies underway, analysis of them is beyond the scope of this
article which is focusing on neuroimages.69

65. Joseph H. Baskin, Judith G. Edersheim & Bruce H. Price, Is a Picture Worth a Thousand
Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 249 (2007).
66. Id.
67. Id. Other researchers note the problems of comparing results of one study to another, due
to different paradigms used in each study. Phan et al., supra note 1, at 171 (criticizing studies that
offer monetary incentive to lie).
68. See Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 612 (noting that the technique used “requires a
cooperative subject”). While the study authors note that the test subjects were told they would be
given a $50 bonus if it could not be determined when they were lying, such incentive in no way
compares to real life consequences for crime suspects. Id. at 606, 611. Simpson remarks that if
subjects refuse to enter the scanner, refuse to respond to questions, give nonresponsive answers, or
even shake their heads during the exam, the results may not be usable. Simpson, supra note 49, at
493.
69. See, e.g., J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New,
Countermeasure-resistant, Accurate, P300-based Method for Detection of Concealed Information,
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 906 (2008) and references cited therein.
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However, since there has been an attempt to use less well-studied
forms of EEG at trial in the US and in India, this article addresses them:
the inaptly-named “brain fingerprinting” and the Brain Electrical
Oscillation Signature test (“BEOS”).
The coiner of the brain
fingerprinting term, Dr. Lawrence A. Farwell, claims that the brain emits
a characteristic wave response when presented with a known stimulus.
Thus, when the brain recognizes something as significant in the current
context in which it is presented, the brain reacts predictably. Farwell
conducted an experiment in which lay persons and FBI agents were
shown acronyms known only to agents. Apparently, only the agents’
brains exhibited this recognition wave.70
In essence, the claim is that this device captures a recognition wave
of the brain. Farwell claims that using EEG technology, he can detect
changes in brain waves that take place over a very short period of time
(approximately one second). These changes can be classified as having
relevant information (knowledge) and not having such information (no
knowledge). Even when the subjects were intentionally trying to
conceal knowledge, Farwell claims that the test could detect accurately
whether the subjects knew or did not know.71
IV. CRITICISM OF BRAIN FINGERPRINTING AND BEOS
The first concern is of course that recognition (if indeed that is what
is displayed) may arise in a variety of ways—some quite innocent.
Second, this test appears to misunderstand the nature of memory, which
does not record and recall information like a video recorder, but layers
memory over memory, changes, loses, restructures, and adapts to
continual addition of new information. Every time a memory is recalled,
it is altered.72

70. See Lawrence A. Farwell, Farwell Brain Fingerprinting: A New Paradigm in Criminal
Investigations, Jan. 12, 1999, at 5.5.1, http://www.mindcontrolforums.com/bf-research.htm; see
Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge
Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 135 (2001). Brain fingerprinting is an inapt
term, since fingerprinting, a form of individualization, seeks to match an unknown sample with a
known sample. Brain fingerprinting does not involve any form of attempted individualized
matching. Rather, the term was likely chosen to draw on the supposed trustworthiness of
fingerprinting comparison. The early uses of DNA as a method of individualization often used the
term “genetic fingerprinting”—a more apt use of the concept. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 289 (2001)
(discussing the use of the term “genetic fingerprinting” with reference to DNA profiling).
71. Farwell & Smith, supra note 70, at 141.
72. See Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, supra note 5, at 1029-30.
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Scholars have leveled serious criticism at Farwell,73 going so far as
to label him “notorious” for the claims he has made.74 Other scholars
note that “Farwell’s claims are widely discounted in the relevant
scientific community . . . .”75 There is little research—other than
Farwell’s—to back up his claims, and he apparently refuses to allow
others to review his algorithms, claiming his technique is proprietary.76
Dr. J. Peter Rosenfeld of Northwestern University, one of the early
scientists involved with EEG-based deception testing with Farwell, has
written an in-depth critique of the technical shortcoming of Brain
Fingerprinting, detailing the misleading nature of Farwell’s claims.77
The BEOS test allegedly builds on Farwell’s work, and it has been
admitted in court in India. The inventors claim that the system can
distinguish between memories of events witnessed and deeds that have
been committed.78 Like Farwell’s work, the BEOS test has met with
much skepticism, despite its recent use in Indian courts. Dr. Rosenfeld
accurately notes that such technology, which is “neither seriously peerreviewed nor independently replicated, [is] not . . . credible.”79 Dr.
Michael Gazzaniga, director of the MacArthur Law & Science Project,80
is likewise dismissive of BEOS, stating that “[a]ll the experts agree. The
work is shaky at best.”81
A further question about the validity and reliability of both fMRI
and EEG images of deception concerns the financial stakes involved in
the neuroimaging of deception. Even if one assumes the scientists are
acting in good faith, the race to the courthouse has financial implications
that should be considered in the evaluation of such science,82 a point
recognized in the remand of the well-known Daubert opinion.83
73. See Sara Solovitch, Mind Reader, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 66-67 (noting that
“many scientists accuse Farwell of making misleading and exaggerated claims”).
74. MORENO, supra note 30, at 104.
75. Greely and Iles, supra note 49, at 388.
76. Solovitch, supra note 73, at 70.
77. See J. Peter Rosenfeld, “Brain Fingerprinting”: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV. OF
MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 20 (2005).
78. See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is Debated, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A10.
79. Id.
80. See Governance, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org/governance.php (last visited
Feb. 18, 2009).
81. Giridharadas, supra note 78.
82. See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND CONTROVERSY IN THE
MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 5-6 (2007) (discussing Cellmark and Lifecodes’ quest to become the
dominant DNA Profiling company in the United States and the errors discovered in their methods
long after much DNA evidence was admitted). Accord COLE, supra note 70, at 287-302 (2001)
(discussing the early development of DNA profiling and explaining some of the problems
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These foregoing critiques do not imply that the science is not
promising; it just may be promising more than it can deliver at this point
in time. It is wiser, I believe, to spend more time in the lab than to rush
the science to the courtroom where, after destroying lives, we have
discovered that, indeed, there was more work to be done.
V. ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS: RELIABILITY AND GENERAL
ACCEPTANCE
No reported case has yet to admit fMRI evidence at trial as proof of
deception (or lack of deception), but it seems likely that advocates will
attempt to convince courts to do so in the relatively near future,
particularly in light of the claims made by companies hoping to be the
first to open the courthouse doors. Since the evidence is novel and
serves the same evidentiary purpose as the polygraph, I would expect
most courts to be hesitant in admitting such evidence. But perhaps it
will not be that straightforward. If history has taught us anything about
forensic science in criminal cases (which are the most likely cases in
which this evidence would be admitted), the rule has been to admit
prosecutorial expert testimony and exclude defense uses of such
evidence.84
For this neuroimaging evidence to be admissible, the advocate of
such evidence must be able, depending on the jurisdiction, to convince a
trial court that this proposed expert evidence is either scientifically
reliable85 or that the scientific theory at issue is generally accepted
associated with the commercial laboratories). Both Cephos and No Lie MRI are commercial
ventures designed to capitalize on fMRI research, as is Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting company.
For further details on these companies, see Moriarty, supra note 36, at 33-34.
83. That an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability
of his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture. But
in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we may not
ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the
courtroom or the lawyer’s office.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). Despite recognizing the
importance of finances in expert testimony, Judge Kozinski exempts forensic science from this
inquiry. “Fingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting, and a variety of other
scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement may indeed have the courtroom as a principal
theatre of operations.” Id. at 1317 n.5. In another article, I have challenged this distinction. See
Moriarty, supra note 7, at 39-42.
84. See NAS REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 10, at 3-9 to 3-11. Moreover, in
United States v. Scheffer, where the Court remarked that there was no consensus on polygraph
reliability, it was the defendant who was seeking to admit such evidence. 523 U.S. 303, 306 (1998).
85. See, e.g., FED. R. OF EVID. 702 (providing, in pertinent part, that an expert may testify if
“(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
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within the field.86 Despite the claims of those attempting to market the
neuroimaging of deception, it should be beyond cavil at this point in
time that neuroimages of deception satisfy neither of these tests. Even if
elemental questions concerning deception can be accurately visualized
on a neuroimage with a cooperating subject, there is too great an analytic
gap from data generated to conclusions about whether a particular
person is deceptive to satisfy any standard of legal admissibility.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence (“FRE”) “occupy the field” in federal courts; that is to say, the
Rules provide the primary source of law for the federal judiciary in
deciding whether evidence should be admitted.87 In 2000, FRE 702,
governing the admission of expert testimony, adopted a reliability
standard in which the proposed testimony must be based on sufficient
facts or data, must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and
the witness testifying must have applied such principles and methods in
a reliable fashion to the facts of the case.88
FRE 702 is an attempt to distill the requirements of the Supreme
Court’s trilogy of cases that govern the admission of expert evidence.89
Collectively, these cases (and the amended FRE 702) exhibit a concern
not just about whether the evidence is generally reliable but about
whether evidence is reliable as used in a given case. “[R]eliability
cannot be judged globally, ‘as drafted,’ but only specifically, ‘as
applied.’ The emphasis [is] on the judgment of reliability as it applies to
facts of the case”). Accord Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993);
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137, 141 (1999) (requiring sufficient proof that the proposed expert evidence is sufficiently reliable
to be admitted).
86. While the foregoing federal reliability standard is used in many states, other states follow
the so-called “general acceptance” standard, which originated in Frye v. United States. 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see, e.g., Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003) (holding
that an expert’s methodology must be generally accepted); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 122
(Ariz. 2000) (holding that the general acceptance test applies to novel scientific evidence).
87. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
88. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, entitled “Testimony By Experts,” provides that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
89. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (“Rule 702 has been amended in response
to Daubert . . . and the many cases applying Daubert . . . .”). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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the individual case, to the ‘task at hand . . . .’”90 Thus, while an x-ray
may be reliable evidence of a skull fracture, it might not be reliable
evidence to support the expert’s claim that a given defendant was legally
insane at the time he committed a homicide. It is not that the x-ray itself
is an unreliable bit of evidence; it is that the interpretation of such
evidence may lack evidentiary reliability. The interpretation of the
image is what rests on a less-than-solid foundation.
Daubert, and cases following, envision a flexible standard, in
which the trial court, as gatekeeper of the evidence, determines whether
expert evidence meets the minimal standard of evidentiary reliability. If
it does, the evidence is admissible and any shortcomings in the evidence
go to weight, not admissibility. In determining whether evidence meets
the standard of evidentiary reliability, the Daubert Court (and
innumerable cases since) focused on several “observations” that the
Court deemed helpful in determining evidentiary reliability: (1) whether
the theory or technique can be or has been tested, (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the
potential or known rate of error of the theory or technique when applied,
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique’s operation, and (5) whether the technique or theory has been
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.91 This flexible
standard for expert testimony was premised on the idea of “evidentiary
reliability” or “trustworthiness.” Rather than wholesale exclusion,
Daubert opined that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof,”
coupled with the court’s power to direct verdicts and grant summary
judgment, were the “appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”92 One difficulty Daubert poses, of course, is
determining the proper line that separates “shaky but admissible” from
“unreliable thus inadmissible.”
The Daubert Court limited the trial court’s focus on reliability to
the methodology employed, not the conclusions generated.93 In one of
the subsequent trilogy of cases the Supreme Court decided, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner,94 the Court softened the line between
methodology and conclusions, stating that
90. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task At Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science after
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773 (2000).
91. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
92. Id. at 596.
93. Id. at 595.
94. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss3/4

18

Moriarty: Visons of Deception

4/24/2009 2:20 PM

MORIARTY

2009]

VISIONS OF DECEPTION

757

conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered.95

The recognition that there may be “simply too great an analytic gap
between the data and opinion proffered” is one that is particularly apt in
analyzing the legal admissibility of neuroimages of deception.
In the final case of the trilogy, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, the
Court described the discretion the trial court had in determining whether
and how these factors should be considered by the trial court:
We . . . conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the
more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help
determine that testimony’s reliability. But . . . the test of reliability is
“flexible,” and . . . the law grants a district court the same broad
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination.96

Although the trilogy embraces a flexible standard, the language of
Kumho Tire provides an important recommendation: “[A] trial court
should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are
reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”97 The
factors provide reasonable measures of the reliability of neuroimaging
evidence.
Not all jurisdictions, however, use a reliability standard. Rather, a
number of courts still use the so-called “general acceptance” test, which
emanates from a 1923 D.C. Court of Appeals decision holding that the
precursor to the polygraph had not yet reached a state of scientific
general acceptance required to be admissible.98 The Frye test does not
analyze the reliability of the proposed evidence; it asks whether novel
scientific evidence has reached the tipping point at which it has become
generally accepted by scientists in the field.
For many decades after the original decision, the Frye test was
mentioned infrequently, but during the 1970s and 1980s, it became the
“the icon for one of the dominant notions of the proper criterion for the
95.
96.
97.
98.
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admissibility of scientific evidence—general acceptance within its
field.”99
In theory, the test is a fairly straightforward one for the courts—it
simply requires courts to determine whether the proponent of the
evidence has established that a novel theory is accepted in the scientific
arena. In practice, however, Frye is a more complicated inquiry and a
standard that has been criticized on various grounds, including its failure
to mesh well with a scientific inquiry.100
Although the federal courts do not follow the Frye general
acceptance standard, a sizeable minority of states continue to do so.101
Moreover, while the federal courts follow a reliability standard, general
acceptance often plays a role in admissibility decisions.
VI. WHY fMRI, BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, AND BEOS IMAGES OF
DECEPTION MEET NEITHER THE RELIABILITY NOR GENERAL
ACCEPTANCE STANDARDS
The problems with the forensic use of brain fingerprinting and
BEOS to detect deception are legion, as discussed above. Moreover,
given the roundly critical commentary about these forms of evidence,
there is no real argument that scientists in that particular field generally
accept the theory that brain fingerprinting or BEOS can accurately
indicate when a subject is telling the truth or lying.
Scientists are creating a fascinating body of work using fMRI to
depict neural correlates of deception. These neuroscientists are
beginning to sketch a portrait of the ways the brain works and the areas
of the brain that are implicated when a subject attempts to deceive or
fails to remember accurately. Sketch, however, may be the operative
word. The studies are just beginning; there are numerous questions
unanswered and numerous areas to be developed. What does not exist is
sufficient proof that neuroimages can accurately prove when an
individual is lying and when she is telling the truth.

99. David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 (1994).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
criticisms of Frye); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1211-12 (1980) (discussing, inter alia,
criticisms of Frye).
101. See 2 JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS at app. 1A (2008) (providing a state-by-state analysis of admissibility standards).
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Taking Daubert’s factors seriously, while the scientists can show
that the subject can be tested and that there is developing an accuracy
rate of somewhere between seventy-five and ninety percent, as published
in peer-reviewed journals, there is still a very long way to go before such
an error rate is within acceptable limits. Moreover, while some
scientists working on neuroimaging and deception studies might claim
these studies are solid proof, there are other, more critical studies from
disinterested scholars about shortcomings in the methods and standards.
When even Dr. Langleben, one of the first neuroscientists to depict
neuroimages related to deception, says the science is not ready, courts
should, indeed must, listen. To date, those who advocate for the
admission of such evidence are only those with a financial stake in the
admissibility of such evidence.102
There is a small number of studies; all of these studies have
substantial shortcomings that do not allow realistic application of the
data generated to real-world conclusions about an individual; there are
complicated problems of differing formats, technology, and testing
methods; the studies have tested few people, all of whom are healthy;
and so on. While fMRI may indicate what areas of the brain are
implicated in deception, we will need to know what else those areas of
the brain indicate before any meaningful conclusions can be drawn.
Moreover, while there are several peer-reviewed studies, the
purpose of the peer review system has not yet been met with
neuroimaging: to allow other scientists to attempt to replicate the results
and to engage in critical analysis of others’ conclusions. “Research
science is all about replication and rival interpretations.”103 Given that
the science is in its infancy, we should expect much more in the way of
robust criticism from various sources before we decide the evidence is
sufficiently trustworthy for the courtroom.
As outlined above, the most substantial question is the appropriate
inference that can be drawn from the image projected. It is, to use the
parlance of Joiner, the “ipse dixit” problem; the gap between the existing
data and the opinion about the meaning of such data. And that is a wide
gap indeed at this point in time.104

102. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Iowa 2003); Farwell, supra note 70, at
1.1.14; Our Business is the Truth, http://www.cephoscorp.com/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2009).
103. See Roger Koppl, Presentation at Forensic Science for the 21st Century: The National
Academy of Sciences’ Report and Beyond, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University (Apr. 4, 2009), http://lst.law.asu.edu/FS09/index.html.
104. History provides a lesson here. As Professor Moenssens cogently states:
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There are other questions, of course, that do not specifically relate
to admissibility standards and that relate to this continual quest, from the
Salem witchcraft trials forward, to find the proper way to extract “truth”
for purposes of proof. It is a question beyond the narrow scope of this
article but is at the heart of any attempt to introduce this type of evidence
in a courtroom.
There is a unique opportunity here with the fMRI neuroimaging of
deception that has been missed with other forms of expert evidence
introduced in criminal trials: the science is developing outside of the
courtroom in multiple, competing laboratories that are testing different
aspects of the scientific endeavor. While one group works on mapping
specific areas of the brain that seem to be implicated with deceptive
answers, other groups are considering what parts of the brain are
involved when there is emotional arousal entwined with the memory of
the event. The science is developing and, to date, it has not really
entered the courtroom.105 The critics are also publishing articles, leading
to a more balanced picture of the limitations of the science.
By comparison, most forensic science was developed specifically to
aid the criminal justice system and was “grandfathered” into the
courtroom as reliable—without serious proof of validity or reliability.106
Most recently, in the National Academy of Sciences’ scathing report on
the shortcomings of forensic science, they found that much forensic
science evidence has been admitted in criminal trials “without any
meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or
reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”107 Admitting
evidence first and asking questions later (if ever) is the evidentiary
But the longer one observes the disciplines of the forensic sciences, the more one has to
deal with strongly conflicting emotions. On the one hand, one admires the truly
revolutionary new methods that have been and are being developed. On the other hand,
one remembers some horror stories of the past when too much haste in rushing new
methods through the evidentiary hoops resulted in convictions on less than sound
scientific bases. I urge caution because its absence is the antithesis of the scientific
method; lack of caution leads to grievous error that tends to bring forensic science into
disrepute.
Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4-5 (1993).
105. There is one exception in which a trial court admitted Farwell’s brain fingerprinting
evidence in a hearing, although it declined to discuss its value in the opinion, nor did it rely on such
evidence when reaching its opinion. See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 512.
106. See generally COLE, supra note 70 (discussing, inter alia, the history of admissibility of
fingerprint comparison); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand
Goals, Tragic Flaws & Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 A.B.A. JUDGES’ J. 16, 28 (2005) (discussing the
ready admissibility of prosecutorial forensic science evidence).
107. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-18.
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pattern that most forensic science has followed, and it is a flawed and
problematic approach for new and developing scientific evidence. Both
with fMRI and DNA evidence, the science is complex and has powerful
potential to profoundly affect the outcomes in cases.108
In the case of DNA profiling evidence, the most science-based and
reliable form of individualization evidence (which attempts to match a
known sample to a crime scene, victim, or defendant), no serious
challenge was raised to the evidence for several years after it was first
admitted.109
There is a chance, however, to do things differently with fMRI
evidence of deception. I would urge an informal evidentiary moratorium
on admission of this evidence unless and until the science has developed
to a place where: (1) the scientists and their critics reach consensus that
the results are truly valid, reliable, reproducible, accurate, and the error
rate is within an acceptable margin of error; (2) the potential
confounding problems related to sample size, group versus individual
determinations, and the potential problems of correlation versus
causation have been sorted out; and perhaps most importantly, (3) there
has been time for sufficient moral, ethical, and jurisprudential
rumination about whether the legal system really wants this type of
evidence.110 This delay provides time for additional peer review,
replication of results, robust disagreements, and discovery of
unanticipated consequences that might arise from this new, fascinating,
and challenging scientific endeavor.

108. See id.
109. See ARONSON, supra note 82, at 7.
110. For more on this subject, see, e.g., Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Philosophic
Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, posted on SSRN.com at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338763.
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